

# Adversarial Examples in Natural Language Processing

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# Adversarial Examples




$x$

“panda”

57.7% confidence

+ .007 ×



$\text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$

“nematode”

8.2% confidence

=



$x + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$

“gibbon”

99.3 % confidence

Two cores in common:

- the perturbations are small
- the ability of fooling DNN models

# Why does it work?

The primary cause of neural networks' vulnerability to adversarial perturbation is their linear nature [1]

adversarial input

$$\tilde{x} = x + \eta \quad \|\eta\|_{\infty} < \epsilon,$$

Consider the dot product


$$w^{\top} \tilde{x} = w^{\top} x + w^{\top} \eta.$$

If  $w$  has  $n$  dimensions and the average magnitude of an element of the weight vector is  $m$

$$w^{\top} \eta \propto \epsilon m n \quad \eta = \text{sign}(w)$$

# How to fix it?

## Adversarial Training [1]



$$-\log p(y \mid \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}_{\text{adv}}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) \text{ where } \mathbf{r}_{\text{adv}} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{r}, \|\mathbf{r}\| \leq \epsilon} \log p(y \mid \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}})$$

With a linear approximation

$$\mathbf{r}_{\text{adv}} = -\epsilon \mathbf{g} / \|\mathbf{g}\|_2 \text{ where } \mathbf{g} = \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \log p(y \mid \mathbf{x}; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}})$$

The objective function

$$\tilde{J}(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}, y) = \alpha J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}, y) + (1 - \alpha) J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x} + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} J(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}, y)))$$

# Virtual Adversarial Training [2]

$$\text{KL}[p(\cdot | \mathbf{x}; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) || p(\cdot | \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}_{\text{v-adv}}; \boldsymbol{\theta})]$$

$$\text{where } \mathbf{r}_{\text{v-adv}} = \arg \max_{\mathbf{r}, \|\mathbf{r}\| \leq \epsilon} \text{KL}[p(\cdot | \mathbf{x}; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) || p(\cdot | \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}})]$$

With a approximation


$$\mathbf{r}_{\text{v-adv}} = \epsilon \mathbf{g} / \|\mathbf{g}\|_2 \text{ where } \mathbf{g} = \nabla_{\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{d}} \text{KL} \left[ p(\cdot | \mathbf{s}; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) || p(\cdot | \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{d}; \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) \right]$$

Where  $\mathbf{d}$  is a small random vector with the same dimension as  $\mathbf{s}$

The objective function


$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \log p(y^{(n)} | x^{(n)}, \theta) + \lambda \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \text{LDS}(x^{(n)}, \theta)$$

# Can it work in text?



We cannot calculate the perturbed inputs for tasks in the NLP field since the inputs consist of **discrete symbols**, which are not a continuous space used in image processing

# Applying AdvT to word embedding space [3]



where  $f_i$  is the frequency of the  $i$ -th word, calculated within all training examples.

$$r^{(n)} = r_{adv}^{(n)} \text{ or } r_{v-adv}^{(n)}$$

# Drawback of applying AdvT to word embedding space

lacks interpretability!!!


- It abandons the generation of adversarial examples interpretable by people.
- We exclusively regard it as a regularizer to stabilize the model.
- It can't generate adversarial examples.

## A Trade-Off

well-formed **VS** low-cost (gradient-based)



# Interpretable Adversarial Perturbation in Embedding Space [4]




How to realize that?

# Interpretable Adversarial Perturbation in Embedding Space

We define direction vector  $d_k^{(t)}$

$$d_k^{(t)} = \frac{\tilde{d}_k^{(t)}}{\|\tilde{d}_k^{(t)}\|_2}, \quad \text{where} \quad \tilde{d}_k^{(t)} = w_k - w^{(t)}.$$



Let  $\alpha^{(t)}$  be a  $|V|$ -dimensional vector, and let  $\alpha_k^{(t)}$  be the  $k$ -th factor of  $\alpha^{(t)}$

Then, we define

$$r(\alpha^{(t)}) = \sum_{k=1}^{|V|} \alpha_k^{(t)} d_k^{(t)}.$$

$$\tilde{X}_{+r(\alpha)} = (w^{(t)} + r(\alpha^{(t)}))_{t=1}^T$$

$$\alpha_{\text{iAdvT}} = \underset{\alpha, \|\alpha\| \leq \epsilon}{\operatorname{argmax}} \left\{ \ell(\tilde{X}_{+r(\alpha)}, \tilde{Y}, \mathcal{W}) \right\} \quad \text{Approximately,} \quad \alpha_{\text{iAdvT}}^{(t)} = \frac{\epsilon g^{(t)}}{\|g\|_2}, \quad g^{(t)} = \nabla_{\alpha^{(t)}} \ell(\tilde{X}_{+r(\alpha)}, \tilde{Y}, \mathcal{W})$$

The Loss function is

$$\mathcal{J}_{\text{iAdvT}}(\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{W}) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{(\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}) \in \mathcal{D}} \ell(\tilde{X}_{+r(\alpha_{\text{iAdvT}})}, \tilde{Y}, \mathcal{W})$$

But, it still has some problem.....

- It is difficult to make small perturbations along the direction of gradients
- The fluency of the generated examples cannot be guaranteed

Fortunately, there are some excellent models in 2019....

- ACL19: Generating Fluent Adversarial Examples for Natural Languages
- ACL19: Generating Natural Language Adversarial Examples through Probability Weighted Word Saliency


They are both based on statistical models.

# CGMH [5] ★★★★★

## Motivation

RNN-based language generation techniques are non-trivial to impose constraints

- Hard constraints, such as the mandatory inclusion of certain keywords in the output sentences
- Soft constraints, such as requiring the generated sentences to be semantically related to a certain topic






# CGMH [5] ★★★★★

## Language model

A statistical language model is a probability contribution over sequences of words.

$$P(w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n) = P(w_1)P(w_2|w_1) \cdots P(w_n|w_1, \dots, w_{n-1})$$

## RNN-based Language model



## CGMH [5] ★★★★★

### detail balance condition

When the probability transition matrix of aperiodic Markov chains satisfies

$$\pi(i)p(j|i) = \pi(j)p(i|j)$$

The final state  $\pi(\cdot)$  is the stable distribution

## Metropolis Hastings(MH) Sampling

1. Initialise  $x^0$
2. For  $i = 0$  to  $N - 1$ 
  - $u \sim U(0, 1)$
  - $x^* \sim q(x^*|x^{(i)})$
  - if  $u < \alpha(x^*) = \min \left( 1, \frac{\pi(x^*)q(x|x^*)}{\pi(x)q(x^*|x)} \right)$   $x^{(i+1)} = x^*$
  - else  $x^{(i+1)} = x^{(i)}$

<http://blog.csdn.net/baimafujin>

The MH framework is flexible, cause

- The **proposal distribution** could be **arbitrary**, as long as the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic
- The **stationary distribution** could be **arbitrary**, because MH algorithm can guarantee detail balance condition

**How to propose proposal & stationary distribution**

CGMH [5] ★★★★★

**proposal distribution**

$$[p_{\text{replace}}, p_{\text{insert}}, p_{\text{delete}}] = [\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}]$$

**Replacement**


The sentence at the current step is

$$X = [w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w_m, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n]$$

Choose a new word for the m-th position by the conditional probability

$$g_{\text{replace}}(X'|X) = \pi(w_m^* = w^c | X_{-m}) = \frac{\pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w^c, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}{\sum_{w \in V} \pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}$$

However, it is difficult to compute  $\pi(w_m^* = w^c | w_{-m})$  for all  $w^c \in V$



# CGMH [5] ★★★★★

## Replacement

Build a **pre-selector** Q to discard  $w_c$  with low forward or backward probability


$$Q(w^c) = \min( \pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w_m^* = w^c), \\ \pi(w_m^* = w^c, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n) )$$

Q is easy to compute by a **forward** and a **backward** language model, and  $\pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w^c, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)$  is no greater than Q

After pre-selection, we compute the conditional probability of selected words by

$$g_{\text{replace}}(x'|x) = \pi(w_m^* = w^c | x_{-m}) = \\ \frac{\pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w^c, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}{\sum_{w \in \mathcal{V}} \pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}$$

Finally, sample a word for replacement





## CGMH [5] ★★★★★

### Insertion

First insert a special token, placeholder <PHD>

Then use  $g_{replace}(\cdot)$  to sample a real word to replace the placeholder

$$g_{replace}(X'|X) = \pi(w_m^* = w^c | X_{-m}) = \frac{\pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w^c, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}{\sum_{w \in \mathcal{V}} \pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}$$

Hence,  $g_{insert}(\cdot)$  is similar to  $g_{replace}(\cdot)$

CGMH [5] ★★★★★

deletion

Suppose

$$\mathbf{x} = [w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w_m, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n]$$

we are about to delete the word  $w_m$ , then

$g_{delete}(x'|x_{t-1})$  equals 1 if  $x' = [w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n]$ , or 0 for other sentences

Notably, insertion and deletion ensure the **ergodicity** of the Markov chain

CGMH [5] ★★★★★

## stationary distribution

### Hard Constraints

$$\pi(\mathbf{x}) \propto p_{\text{LM}}(\mathbf{x}) \cdot \mathcal{X}_{\text{keyword}}(\mathbf{x})$$

- $p_{\text{LM}}$  is a general sentence probability computed by a language model,
- $x_{\text{keyword}}$  is the indicator function showing if the keywords are included in the generated sentence

$x_{\text{keyword}} = 1$  if all constraints are satisfied (keywords appearing in the sentence), or 0 otherwise

CGMH [5] ★★★★★

## stationary distribution

### Soft Constraints

$$\pi(\mathbf{x}) \propto p_{\text{LM}}(\mathbf{x}) \cdot \mathcal{X}_{\text{match}}(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{x}_*)$$

- $p_{\text{LM}}(x)$  is a general sentence probability computed by a language model
- $x_{\text{match}}(x|x_*)$  is a matching score

We have several choices for  $x_{\text{match}}(x|x_*)$

- **Keyword matching** (KW) as a soft constraint
- **Word embedding similarity** as a soft constraint
- **Skip-thoughts similarity**(ST) as a soft constraint

# CGMH [5] ★★★★★

## Acceptance Rate

$$A_{\text{replace}}^*(x'|x) = \frac{p_{\text{replace}} \cdot g_{\text{replace}}(x|x') \cdot \pi(x')}{p_{\text{replace}} \cdot g_{\text{replace}}(x'|x) \cdot \pi(x)}$$

$$\approx \frac{\pi(w_m|x_{-m}) \cdot \pi(x')}{\pi(w'_m|x_{-m}) \cdot \pi(x)} = 1$$

$$A_{\text{insert}}^*(x'|x) = \frac{p_{\text{delete}} \cdot g_{\text{delete}}(x|x') \cdot \pi(x')}{p_{\text{insert}} \cdot g_{\text{insert}}(x'|x) \cdot \pi(x)}$$

$$= \frac{p_{\text{delete}} \cdot \pi(x')}{p_{\text{insert}} \cdot g_{\text{insert}}(x'|x) \cdot \pi(x)}$$

$$A_{\text{delete}}^*(x'|x) = \frac{p_{\text{insert}} \cdot g_{\text{insert}}(x|x') \cdot \pi(x')}{p_{\text{delete}} \cdot g_{\text{delete}}(x'|x) \cdot \pi(x)}$$

$$= \frac{p_{\text{insert}} \cdot g_{\text{insert}}(x|x') \cdot \pi(x')}{p_{\text{delete}} \cdot \pi(x)}$$

1. Initialise  $x^0$

2. For  $i = 0$  to  $N - 1$

$u \sim U(0, 1)$

$x^* \sim q(x^*|x^{(i)})$

if  $u < \alpha(x^*) = \min\left(1, \frac{\pi(x^*)q(x|x^*)}{\pi(x)q(x^*|x)}\right)$

else

$x^{(i+1)} = x^{(i)}$

$x^{(i+1)} = x^*$

<http://blog.csdn.net/baimafujin>

$$g_{\text{replace}}(x'|x) = \pi(w_m^* = w^c|x_{-m}) =$$

$$\frac{\pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w^c, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}{\sum_{w \in \mathcal{V}} \pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}$$

CGMH [5]




Result

Keyword(s)	Generated Sentences
friends	My good <b>friends</b> were in danger .
project	The first <b>project</b> of the scheme .
have, trip	But many people <b>have</b> never made the <b>trip</b> .
lottery, scholarships	But the <b>lottery</b> has provided <b>scholarships</b> .
decision, build, home	The <b>decision</b> is to <b>build</b> a new <b>home</b> .
attempt, copy, painting, denounced	The first <b>attempt</b> to <b>copy</b> the <b>painting</b> was <b>denounced</b> .

But, how to apply it to Adversarial Examples

MHA [6] ★★

objective



Word change, Output change!!!

How to select a substitute word?

## MHA [6] ★★

Pre-selection

$$S^B(w|x) = LM(w|x_{[1:m-1]}) \cdot LM_b(w|x_{[m+1:n]})$$

w-MHA Pre-selection

$$S^W(w|x) = S^B(w|x) \cdot S\left(\frac{\partial \tilde{\mathcal{L}}}{\partial e_m}, e_m - e\right)$$

- $S$  is the cosine similarity function
- $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} = L(\tilde{y}|x, C)$  is the loss function on the target label
- $e_m$  and  $e$  are the embeddings of the current word ( $w_m$ ) and the substitute ( $w$ ).

$$g_{\text{replace}}(x'|x) = \pi(w_m^* = w^c | x_{-m}) = \frac{\pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w^c, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}{\sum_{w \in \mathcal{V}} \pi(w_1, \dots, w_{m-1}, w, w_{m+1}, \dots, w_n)}$$



# MHA [6] ★★ ★

## Result

Case 1
<b>Premise:</b> <i>three men are sitting on a beach dressed in orange with refuse carts in front of them.</i>
<b>Hypothesis:</b> <i>empty trash cans are sitting on a beach.</i>
<b>Prediction:</b> ⟨Contradiction⟩
<b>Genetic:</b> <i>empties trash cans are sitting on a beach.</i>
<b>Prediction:</b> ⟨Entailment⟩
<b>b-MHA:</b> <i>the trash cans are sitting in a beach.</i>
<b>Prediction:</b> ⟨Entailment⟩
<b>w-MHA:</b> <i>the trash cans are sitting on a beach.</i>
<b>Prediction:</b> ⟨Entailment⟩
Case 2
<b>Premise:</b> <i>a man is holding a microphone in front of his mouth.</i>
<b>Hypothesis:</b> <i>a male has a device near his mouth.</i>
<b>Prediction:</b> ⟨Entailment⟩
<b>Genetic:</b> <i>a masculine has a device near his mouth.</i>
<b>Prediction:</b> ⟨Neutral⟩
<b>b-MHA:</b> <i>a man has a device near his car.</i>
<b>Prediction:</b> ⟨Neutral⟩
<b>w-MHA:</b> <i>a man has a device near his home.</i>
<b>Prediction:</b> ⟨Neutral⟩

# Bibliography

## Adversarial Examples Theory

- ICLR15: Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples
- ICLR16: Distributional smoothing with virtual adversarial training
- TPAMI18: Virtual Adversarial Training A Regularization Method for Supervised and Semi-Supervised Learning

## Adversarial Examples in text

- ICLR17: Adversarial training methods for semi-supervised text classification
- IJCAI18: Interpretable Adversarial Perturbation in Input Embedding Space for Text
- ACL19: Generating Fluent Adversarial Examples for Natural Languages
- ACL19: Generating Natural Language Adversarial Examples through Probability Weighted Word Saliency
- ARXIV19: A survey on Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Text

## Something interesting in Adversarial Examples

- IJCAI19: Improving the Robustness of Deep Neural Networks via Adversarial Training with Triplet Loss
- NIPS19: Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features
- NIPS19: Learning to Confuse Generating Training Time Adversarial Data with Auto-Encoder